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ABSTRACT 
The paper is a Meditation <variant on the manner of Aurelius and 
Descartes) concerning the immediate situation, in the United States, of 
poetry as a discourse of political engagement. As such, the paper is 
a highly personal one. It means to offer an account of the peculiar 
limits within which contemporary poetry in the United States is forced 
to get carried on, as well as an explanation of the context in which 
those limits were defined. It also suggests possible ways to exploit 
the special resources of contemporary poetry (formally and socially 
conceived) for political discourse and social critique. The paper is 
most centrally concerned to illuminate the special kinds of critical 
reflection which contemporary poetry, by virtue of its marginal 
position, makes available. The paper's two main sections involve 
the author's own reflexive analysis of his encounters with certain 
texts by Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Theodor Adorno, and Carolyn Forche. 

POLITICS AND CONTEHPORARY POETRY 
Jerome J. NcGann 
(for Clayton, Jill, Harjorie, Paul, Susan) 
l-le do !cnmv ",hat's going on, and we let it go on. 
(T. Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow) 
Privileged people often tell personal stories about themselves 
which show how their lives connect with more significant human lives or 
with more important social and political matters. Poets and writers do 
this all the time, sometimes in order to serve their own interests, 
occasionally to illuminate, through the negative and darkened glass of 
their experiences, the character of the larger world and its recurrent 
darkness. Such histories, even the most self-serving, are eventually 
delivered over to someone's critical reflection, and their full --
often mystified -- meaning gets exposed. In the first volume of his 
History of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky immortalized the tawdry 
diaries of Tzar Nicholas II. 
What follows here is the personal narrative of an episode in a 
writing career. I give it because it throws into relief several matters 
of importance relating to the social and institutional frameworks of 
contemporary American poetry, and because it may help one to reflect upon 
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the significance of those frameworks -- to reflect upon the need for 
reflection, and the possible consequence of not doing so. 
I shall begin with a summary. In 1975 I left Chicago (after 10 
years) and moved back east, and I decided not to publish or try to 
publish my poetry any longer (I was active in these pursuits between 
1968-1975). I did not stop writing verse, however, or publishing it 
privately in collaboration with other writers and artists. In 1982, 
having moved to southern California, I found myself reconsidering my 
decision of 1975. I also found that the idea of reconnecting with 
public channels of poetry -- even more, the idea that I might actually 
consider such a possibility -- was deeply disturbing. Later, when a 
friend of mine forced me to reflect upon this history, I reached 
certain conclusions which before had only seemed dimly apparent. 
Here is the narrative, the reflections, and the emerging 
conclusions. 
I. 
In 1975 I read for the first time a series of essays by Hans 
Magnus Enzensberger on the industries of consciousness, and in 
particular his trenchant essay liThe Aporias of the Avant Garde." l 
Enzensberger's prose is implacable and my encounter with it left me ashamed. 
Since [World War I] imperialism has developed such mighty 
instruments for the industrial manipulation of consciousness 
that it is no longer dependent on literature. Vice versa, 
literature's critical function has been shrinking. Already in the 
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thirties Walter Benjamin could ascertain "that the bourgeois 
production and publication apparatus can assimilate, even 
propagate, an astonishing mass of revolutionary themes without 
putting its own existence into serious doubt." (90-91) 
Passages like these seemed to me, at the time, revelations -- not 
merely for their explicit ideas, but even more for their spiritual 
character, their moral stance. Enzensberger's style sets a high 
privilege upon clarity of mind, freedom from hypocrisy and self-
deception, and uncompromised intellectual integrity. 
By now, of course, his arguments have themselves been fully acculturated 
and his work suffers the inevitable threat of diminishment by exploitive 
repetition: "Deliver, consume; deliver, consume: that is the imperative 
of the market" (85). In the United States, the repetition appears in 
the literary-intellectual work which is delivered and consumed in the 
post-modern (thus it is named and identified) consciousness industries: 
that is to say, quite simply, in the organs and media which exist in 
and finally serve the interests of the state ideological apparatuses. 
The problem is at once simple and terrible. Can the artist, 
intellectual, anyone serve both god and mammon? Enzensherger's 
uncompromising answer to this question seemed to me -- still seems to 
me -- impressive. Yet there are problems. 
[Poetry's] political mission is to ••• continue to speak 
to everyone about things of which no one speaks •••• This 
is the most difficult of missions. None is easier to forget. 
There is no one to demand an accounting; on the contrary, the 
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man who betrays his mission to the interests of those in authority 
is rewarded. But in poetry there are no extenuating circum-
stances. A poem that offers itself for sale, whether in error 
or from baseness, is condemned to death; there is no reprieve. 
(81-82) 
If this is a powerful, even a heroic, statement, the very clarity of 
its view exposes its problematic character. In the first place, 
Enzensberger's own words seem to belong to another world, the way Evan Dhu's 
heroic statement to the courtroom in Waverley fell upon those who had no 
ears to hear. To a postmodern consciousness, these words must seem naive, 
for their own bibliographical history -- their transmission across 
various state boundaries and into different languages -- testifies to 
the domination against which they are protesting. A complex 
ideological network carries this message across half the world and 
thereby the message undergoes a transubstantiation. The process is at 
once wondrous and terrible. 
In the second place, Enzensberger's ideas about poetry seem 
odd, even anachronistic. To speak as he does of the possibility that 
poetry and poets might betray SOme high mission or calling, that the 
value of poetical work could be debased in our time if poets are not 
on their moral guard: these ideas have surely blinked at certain 
quotidian matters. What is the market value of poetry and poets, what 
is their moral value that any market should take them seriously? 
What, in short, is the meaning of Enzensberger's metaphors? Poetry 
today does not command a position of great social importance. Rather, 
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it has become a kind of social ornament which the industries of 
consciousness permit into the dominant layers of culture because they 
find it convenient to do so. Poetry now has persuaded few people that 
they should tremble to think that it might "betray its mission," or be 
condemned, without reprieve, to death. 
However I would read Enzensberger's arguments sympathetically 
or critically, with an eye on Enzensberger or with an eye on his 
subject matter the problem appeared the same. How is one to operate 
at all, in poetry or in polemical prose, within the consciousness 
industries, how use (or be used by) the ideological apparatuses of the 
states? In 1975 it appeared to me neither right nor possible to develop 
a politically conscious poetry within social structures which were by 
their historical nature committed to altering its critical force. That 
a fair number of poets since the Second World War had been able to 
produce such poetry seemed to me simply anomalous, and I let it go at that. 
During the seven years between 1975-1982 my view of the history of 
contemporary American poetry did not appreciably change. My sense of 
the importance of Enzensberger's comments on the consciousness industry 
also remained intact, nor did it matter in the least whether I 
emphasized to myself the blindness or the insight of his commentary. 
More than anything else I was impressed by the comprehensiveness 
perhaps, the absoluteness of his criticisms. It was a moral 
attitude and mode of thought to which I was prepared to respond. The 
appropriation of poetry by the academy, its production and 
reproduction through that most conservative of cultural institutions, 
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had become a fact of poetry's life which most poets seemed either 
unwilling or unable to resist. Or rather, the poetry had come to 
take the stamp of the academy and the world which that academy served: 
Nihil obstat, Imprimatur. Everywhere the books seemed impressed by 
their culture. 
It is now apparent to me that this view of American poetry is 
absolutely corrupt: not (as it were) without its truth, but rather with 
its truths fundamentally weakened by virtue of its absolutist 
perspective. A great deal of American poetry stands and has long stood 
at a peripheral or antagonistic remove from the academy and the 
channels of the high book trade. If these dominant cultural 
institutions often (later) absorb and seek to co-opt this "other" work, 
that negative reproductive process cannot finally alter the work's 
original historical character or its permanent human value. At most it 
can obscure or mystify these matters. And if the culture's dominant 
institutions often (in the immediate present) turn away from and 
invisibilize this other work, that blindness does not change the 
reality of the actual situation. 
Of course one always knows these things. Nevertheless, so strong 
is the perspective of our centers of culture, especially on academic 
minds like my own, that its illusions can maintain their force even in 
the face of recognized reality: so we call peripheral poetry 
peripheral, and the center, the center. And we suspect that if the 
center is corrupt, the outback is cut off and doomed. Thus we are to 
be deceived by words and the images they mount up. 
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But what if the center is an illusion in itself? Or: if the center 
were imagined not to exist, would the elsewhere go away? 
II. The Imperative of Reflection 
Questions like these, and their corollary significances, began to 
frame themselves in my mind in 1982 through my experiences with the 
radically, and often deliberately, marginal work of poets and artists 
in southern California. These experiences were brought into clearer 
focus through my encounter with two books: Theodor Adorno's Minima Moralia, 
which I read for the first time a year ago, and Carolyn Forche's 
The Country Between Us. Forche's poems have been much praised 
for their ability to utter persuasive political ideas in the medium of 
a highly "personal" and "sensuous" poetry; they have also been 
occasionally attacked (on the same score) as factitious and 
inauthentic. I want to consider Forche's poems and the responses 
they have evoked because this entire event, I think, helps to clarify 
the problems now facing politically conscious artists and intellectuals 
in the United States. But first I want to remark briefly on Minima 
Moralia since that book's grim and severe meditations set the 
terms in which, on the one hand, I came to reconsider some of my 
original ideas about political poetry, and, on the other, I was to 
understand Forche's book and its reviewers. 
Adorno's book, originally published in 1951, is -- like 
Enzensberger's -- consciously written against the background of 
Gramsci's and Benjamin's ideas about the responsibilities of artists 
and intellectuals in powerful, late capitalist societies. No subject 
8 
brings out more sharply the idiosyncratic differences which mark off 
their (basically congruent) approaches toward a critique of western 
society in the twentieth century. Benjamin's and Adorno's discussions 
of movies and the film industry epitomize the character of the various 
(implicit or explicit) exchanges which get carried on. That is to say, 
because the topics are so difficult and problematic, the controversies 
surface repeatedly at the most fundamental levels. Reading these 
exchanges, one is often forced to radical shifts of position. 
Gramsci's life and work, and Enzensberger's writings, may 
highlight the critical privilege which alienation creates for the 
artist and intellectual. But a set of remarks by Adorno may overthrow 
the illusions of such a privilege; for in a world which seeks to 
transform all radical social critique into "constructive social 
criticism", no position or idea can ever count itself secure. 
Antithesis. He who stands aloof runs the risk of believing 
himself better than others and misusing his critique of society 
as an ideology for his private interest. While he gropingly forms 
his own life in the frail image of a true existence, he should 
never forget its frailty, nor how little the image is a substitute 
for true life. Against such awareness, however, pulls the 
momentum of the bourgeois within him. The detached observer is as 
much entangled as the active participant; the only advantage of 
the former is his insight into his entanglement, and the 
infinitesimal freedom that lies in knowledge as such. His own 
distance from business at large is a luxury which only that 
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business confers. This is why the very movement of withdrawal 
bears features of what it negates. It is forced to develop a 
coldness indistinguishable from that of the bourgeois.2 
I have sketched the Marxian context of these remarks in order to 
prevent a misunderstanding of what Adorno is talking about. Read by 
itself this passage might appear as a traditional call to political 
engagement, a plea that artists and intellectuals give up the illusion 
that they occupy a neutral critical position in society. But this is 
not what Adorno is saying. Rather, his commentary -- like 
Enzensberger's -- offers an interpretation of the desperate 
significance of the history of Marxian critical thought in the 20th 
century. Because all critique is threatened with appropriation by the 
state, Enzensberger counsels an abandonment of traditional avant-garde 
positions. Adorno, however, has glimpsed the aporias of the postmodern 
Marxian consciousness, and he counters it not with a program of action 
but with a call for deeper reflection. 
Reading Adorno in this context exposes realities which we 
understand but, for all that, which we still find difficult to accept: 
that in the present social structure all courses of action are formally 
and theoretically compromised in advance. Scholars, poets, artists, 
intellectuals operate within or without the academy, they make use of and 
are used by institutions and their organs of expression; or, they refuse 
involvement and operate in local groups and at the periphery of the 
dominant culture -- in small cells or reading groups that can be found 
throughout the country. In the latter you avoid being cursed to the 
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cycles of consumption and delivery, but this special privilege attaching 
to voluntary alienation carries it own sorts of peril, as Adorno suggests. 
Besides, the avoidance itself may be only an immediate condition which 
conceals an eventual temptation or fate, if not a hidden and hypocritical 
project. Will Mail Art maintain the fragile yet devastating critique 
of the ideologies which dominate contemporary art? Will local success 
spoil the Language Poets? Who can tell. Adorno's meditation suggests 
that the cultural obliquity of these movements and their 
representatives is a guarantee of nothing so far as artistic 
authenticity is concerned. In such matters, as Shelley once said, 
"Each to himself must be the oracle." 
Adorno's call for a deeper critical reflexiveness supplies a 
double advantage/obligation for artists and intellectuals in postmodern 
capitalist societies, most especially in the United States. First, by 
calling attention to the (ultimately Romantic) illusion of non-
compromised ideological activities, Adorno paradoxically licenses 
authentic action in any quarter of the dominant cultural system. 
Second, this license lays down a reciprocal demand, that each person's 
intellectual and artistic practise be scrupulously analyzed in terms of 
the (moral and social) imperatives which are exposed in the 
institutionalized frameworks where artists function. In particular, a 
poet must seek to make explicit his or her precise relation to the 
ideologies of the center or the periphery. There can be no business as 
usual, either within the structures supported by the state or outside those 
structures, in the cadres of saints or the cenacles of our saving remnants. 
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"Under which king, Bezonian; speak, or die." 
Both Enzensberger and Adorno remind poets and intellectuals of 
their obligation to reflect upon the social engagements of their work. 
This demand gains a special urgency in Adorno, who has a more precise 
and comprehensive awareness of the social and political nexus of 
every type of artistic and ideological product. Poets will find an 
exemplary form of conscience in his work, a model of the double 
act of reflection which should be expected of them: first, the primary 
consciousness that poetical work is socially engaged willy nilly; and 
then the secondary consciousness which probes the specific character of 
the social engagement to be found in one's experience and to be 
re-presented in one's poetry. 
III. Poetry in ~ Compromised Society 
The charge brought against Caroline Forche's The Country Between 
Us is essentially mauvais foi: according to Eliot Weinberger, in this 
book "EI Salvador was being reduced to Forche". 
I don't see Forche as a political poet at all, for the poems 
neither illuminate a political situation, are an exhortation to arms, 
nor artifacts themselves of a political reality. They belong, rather, 
to the genre of revolutionary tourism.3 
This is a devastating critique, justified in relation to the lines 
which Weinberger quotes,4 troubling with respect to the book as a whole. 
For Forche personally, Weinberger's is a review which might well draw 
her to a fresh examination of her writing projects. For American (by 
which I mean United States) poets in general, his remarks drive home --
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in several senses -- an idea that has come to seem important in my own 
work: that social critique mounted from a de facto compromised position 
might regard itself and its own cultural vantage as its primary subject. 
Caroline Forche is nowadays taken to be a political poet because 
she writes about EI Salvador. Furthermore, this judgment about her 
"politicalness" assumes that "political poet" and "revolutionary 
inspiration" are more or less equivalent. But these ideas are true 
only in certain particular circumstances (e.g., in periods of social 
turmoil when radical change is an immediate and viable issue). In 
other places and circumstances, to assume this kind of 
"politicalness" might be called (by politicians) "adventurism", and 
perhaps (by artists at work themselves) "tourism" or even "careerism". 
In such other places and circumstances -- witness the exemplary cases 
of Rossetti or Baudelaire -- the most profoundly "political" writer, 
the most telling social judgment, may well come from voices which raise 
to our awareness their own evident contradictions and self-destructive 
limits; or from books -- I have in mind the novels of Balzac and 
James -- which expose the social networks in which certain kinds of 
human beings are at once complicit and brutalized, the accomplices as 
well as the victims of their own social orders. 
In practical terms, if an American poet is to write about Central 
America now, he or she may arrogate solidarity with such exploitation 
and suffering only at a fearful -- perhaps even an intolerable -- risk. 
The case of EI Salvador is especially clear. An American writer -- any 
writer -- might well engage to write propaganda for justice and freedom 
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in EI Salvador, and this could be a work of great honor. But poetry? 
That task might better fall to the poets who live through, who are a 
part of, the special fire and contradictions of which we are only (at 
best) the witnesses, and (at worst) the spectators. The projects of 
translating into English the recent (or even the ancient) poetry of 
Central and South America seem especially impressive precisely because 
these projects have taken into full account the political structure of 
this hemisphere's present and past history. 
Whatever one's thoughts on that matter, Forche's assumption 
of solidarity with the struggle in El Salvador is an important 
event for academic poets because her gesture helps to clarify 
the problem of how one writes political poetry in a compromised 
society. Traditionally, (i.e., since the early 19th century), 
left-wing poets have expressed their sympathy via a maneuver toward 
identification with those who suffer: we recall Shelley and Byron in 
particular. But Shelley's and Byron's philhellenism is not compromised 
the way Swinburne's raptures of distress over Italy are compromised, 
because England's position in relation to Greece and Italy is, in each 
case, quite different; and Forche's America stands, in relation to El 
Savador, already judged, weighed, and found sorely wanting. Neither 
Forche nor any other American poet can evade the consequences of that 
social fact, as her verse so painfully shows: 
You will fight 
and fighting, you will die. I will live 
and living cry out until my voice is gone 
to its hollow of earth, where with our 
hands and by the lives we have chosen 
we will dig deep into our deaths. 
I have done all that I could do. 
Link hands, link arms with me •••• 
("Message" p. 21) 
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This is neither poetry nor propaganda, it is simply (or at best) bad, 
misconceived writing (at worst it is a scandal to the cause it means to 
honor). Weinberger's critique of Forche's book finds its deepest 
justification in passages like this, where Forche only persuades us 
that she has not done all that she could -- all that she must -- do. 
For her sympathy here is precisely conscienceless, empty of all 
but the shallowest critical reflection upon her social position. 
Nevertheless, Forche's book is important for having forced to the 
open, once again in America, the whole social structure of the issue of 
serious political poetry. More than that, her book's political themes 
may not always fail to strike true on the ear. Consider this passage from, 
"Photograph of My Room ll : 
Under the bed, a pouch of money: 
pesetas, dinar, francs, the coins 
of no value in any other place. 
In the notebooks you will find 
those places: the damp inner thighs, 
the delicate rash left by kisses, 
fingers on the tongue, a swallow 
of brandy, a fire. 
It is all there, the lies 
told to myself because of Paris, 
the stories I believed in Salvador 
and Granada •••• (p.3S) 
IS 
I remark this passage in particular because Weinberger singled it out 
for special dispraise. 
"Paris" and "Granada II are unexplained elsewhere; ••• the sex is 
strictly Playboy, complete with brandy and fire •••• all the bases 
are swiftly touched in an air of world-weariness: the victim who 
suffers because of distant events in which she has no part. (p. 163) 
It is true, I think, that the whole poem accumulates to the sentimental 
result which Weinberger has noted. But perhaps not this passage, the 
point of which Weinberger may have missed. It is difficult to say for 
certain if Forche intended the effect, but the details here make a 
sharp, self-critical arrangement, a satire on the rich person's 
transcontinental life which has been nourishing its "glamour" 
on liberal and left-wing ideology.S 
Forche's poetry carries a negative significance for Weinberger, 
yet many have been moved by her work. For myself, reading her has 
called to mind Adorno's views on critical reflexiveness. Forche 
has reached for a political verse of sympathy and solidarity, very 
much in the manner of Shelley, Byron, and Swinburne; and that is well, 
whatever the value of the poetry as such. But other choices are 
possible. American writing might reach for other kinds of home truths, a 
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deeper reflection on the experience of contemporary America. For--
and this in contrast to Central America -- "Meaningful social change" does 
not seem to lie on the immediate horizon of this country, only "constructive 
social criticism" with its growing twilight and eventual darkness --
metallic dawn, and a plastic, engineered noon. No one is better placed to 
express what it means to live in such a world than the pure products 
and poets of America. And the life of this peculiar world is even a 
matter of importance to people living anywhere, whether inside of it, 
at its periphery, or in its orbit. 
Instantaneously and repeatedly. Blank serves as a station 
for our senses, making possible an impression of continuance. 
Subject comes to be formed in much the same way. And so, 
Blank comes to be found thoroughly interspersed throughout 
Subject, forming an integral part of any act. When trying to 
bring it into focus, it must be remembered that Blank is widely 
dispersed, capable of behaving in many different ways at once, 
and itself plays a fundamental role in the act of focusing. 6 
If I were you I would begin with hate, where you may be 
certain of your footing. This is not something you can learn 
over there or ever by yourself. But I can help you. 
Here in Pasadena you start by coming south across Colorado 
Blvd., or north beyond Foothill. You are looking for 
San Marino or the best parts of Pasadena, or those lovely 
sections near the arroyo or up near the hills in Altadena. 
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The places where people care about their homes and do all 
they can for their children's education. This is where you 
should begin, though it appears, I agree, a most unlikely 
place. But here if the people are not smiling or talking 
affably to anyone they meet (yourself included), they will 
be serious and busy, they will be moving everywhere with 
evident purpose and self-direction, though they may only 
be jogging. 7 
Those are two possible ways of putting it, I think, home truths that 
need to be told. In this kind of poetry one is meant to observe what 
it means to suffer the truth of a life that has been given, accepted, 
and discovered or unmasked too late: an uncompromised poetry of a 
compromised society. Why else do we read Martial (or don't we)? Why 
else has Alan Dugan been so soon, so wrongly, forgotten by the very 
academy which once thought it had discovered him? 
American poets now might do well to put their hand to this work. 
We are a culture whose lineaments of gratified desire are not what 
Blake had in mind when he coined that phrase. This land of 
gratification, along with the peculiar incoherences and suffering which 
it generates at home and abroad, needs to find its true voice of 
feeling. How else are we to understand the dialectic which is the 
misery and the happiness of America, the lies which compose the 
architecture of its awful truths? 
Truth is lies which have hardened. 
This should be obvious from the fact that the obverse is also 
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correct. The same obviousness obtains for correctness. 
Truth, which will ~ be more than the notion of truth, 
keeps for itself only its own over-guarded presences •••• 
Truth is the purest notions of dominations, not without 
persons, not without social exigencies, and not aside from 
the facets of the experienced tracts of truth. It is, in and 
by itself, the misnomer. 
(Alan Davies, "Lies") 
For human beings living north of Mexico, a useful way to see El Salvador 
is by looking carefully at the places we live in, the people we talk 
to, the things we do. Our truths about that country, left and right, 
have hardened into the discourse of our media, the texts and screens 
where we now may learn -- if we look carefully -- to see ourselves. 
Surely one of our poetry's chief functions must be to re-present this 
world to ourselves, to reflect its strange and estranged humanness 
back to the people who are its citizens, representatives, and victims. 
This is the solidarity of America's social conscience, whose poets 
have the privilege to reveal a world where every sphere of its life lies 
under the dominion of its own imperial power. Poems come from this 
land to expose its reality in such a way that (a) its falseness becomes 
manifest (critique); (b) an actual human world may be glimpsed as an 
Idea (utopia); (c) the present character of "the way we live now" is given 
back to the reader as a field of very particular contradictions which 
appear in the verse as the special set of its emotional tensions. 
Thirty years ago and more Ginsberg invented a rhetoric that served, 
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as Rossetti, in fading 19th century England, invented a precious 
mandarin style which also served. Kaddish and The House of Life 
are terrible poems about hell, lost paradises, and tragic illusions 
about the worlds and the peoples which gave birth to those things, and 
about the poets who then imagined what they knew. Now, of course, the 
myth of innocence which Ginsberg was able to invoke is not possible for 
an American poet, and it may not be possible again for a long time. 
Much closer to us stand Rossetti's (and, after him, Stevens') fantastic 
castles of evasion and flight, a self-conscious poetry expressing its 
knowledge of fear, threat, and pain in the illusions of their absence. 
Do we know that from the vantage of such supreme fictions one may 
produce the poetry of a hope that appears everywhere as despair? We 
cannot until we recognize the appearance of despair in the illusions of 
their absence. 
Do we know that people will find a use for such verse, even in 
Central America? 
IV. 
"Can the goal you seek be found by starting from the ground of 
moral biography? Or must the Subject ••• first be dislodged? •• Make 
sure that 'writing' gets to the page before 'I' do." 
A friend said this to me in response to an earlier version of the 
previous "writing". He also said: "It is the voice of the logic of the 
totality which says that 'all courses of action are formally and 
theoretically compromised in advance.' Why speak for that voice? For 
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possibility is the very thing which cannot be foreclosed." 
Possibilities should not be foreclosed. It is possible that The 
Country Between Us was conceived in bad faith and will be used wrongly 
-- indeed, the latter is likely, even inevitable; and it is equally 
possible that Forche has unwittingly reduced EI Salvador to herself in 
her book. But it is also possible that the act of that book will make 
a difference, has already -- in certain quarters, for some people 
made a difference. Possibilities are not to be foreclosed. 
It is also possible that "the voice" of "the logic of the totality" 
requires expression in verse. Might someone need to know, to 
realize, or to remember that "all courses of action are formally and 
theoretically compromised in advance"? In those thoughts lies a reason 
for silence, or a reason for speaking. Nor can we tell in advance, by 
the logic of some other totalized thought, what will be the value of 
such silence or such speech. 
A few last things remain to be said here. First, after the 
pursuit of silence and Subjectlessness -- after the experience of our 
cultural resorts during the past decade or so -- some new acts of writing 
or speaking, in verse or otherwise, on the matter of the politics of 
poetry, do not seem out of place. In her book Forche makes a clear 
and simple set of statements. If her work does not encourage (or 
dramatize) a reflection on the act of her own art, or the context 
(academic, North American) out of which it was made, it does other things 
that may be equally necessary. (For one thing it may encourage us to 
sympathize with -- to enter into -- a culture which is not, on the one 
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hand, our own, but which is, on the other, subject to our culture's 
inherited and arbitrary political power.) 
Second, Forche's work need not set before our minds a definition 
or limit of what may be demanded of poetry in respect to politics. 
Indeed, one may perhaps have (good) reasons for believing that "moral 
biography" is a solid ground to start from. Is "dislodging the 
Subject" a totalized thought? Does anything at all get done which is 
not done by the Subject, acting alone or in concert? Does "Something 
Happen" when the Subject is dislodged, is Joseph Heller right when he 
suggests the following meaning for that phrase: the language/illusion 
generated by dislodged subjects in order to create the figment of a 
virtue (or a vice) out of the appearance of a necessity? 
Adorno has counseled a permanent need to reflect, and reflect 
upon, the events and deeds of our worlds. A poet is one locus of 
particular deeds and events, as poetry is a special kind of reflective 
work. Reading Enzensberger one may feel I certainly felt -- that a 
special responsibility and privilege has been laid upon poets and 
poetry, as if they were the "last and only place of refuge" for a 
degrading society. But they are not, and probably never have been, 
though sometimes it has been fruitful to think that they are (for 
example, in the early 19th century). 
Indeed, to think that one's work and mode of work makes a 
difference is perhaps an absolute for vital human conduct. 
Which brings me to a last point. Poetry is a marginal activity in 
our age, whether it is carried on within relatively large institutions 
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(like the academy) or at even more extreme peripheries (as in the many 
local centers of poetic work, and small presses, and transitory 
groups). The dominant art media of our day -- TV and the movies -- are 
licensed to expressive possibilities which are closed to contemporary 
poets. (Adorno was hopelessly misguided when he condescended to these 
forms of artistic work.) But poetry possesses -- Qy virtue of its 
marginality -- a special critical privilege. No one is in a better 
position to reflect upon the invisible and suppressed aspects of a 
world than the person who is its most alienated member. Trotsky called 
this "the privilege of historical backwardness", and the entire Marxian 
analytic is grounded to its truth. 
This very moment is, therefore, peculiarly opportune for the 
resort of poetry: the Subject occupies the margins of culture, the poet 
is an all-but invisible communicator honored in memory rather than 
event, and the forms of poetic discourse have achieved an acute stage 
of historical backwardness. 
"Why would anyone choose such a mode of discourse?" 
"Partly because in poetry you may say things which no one need 
pay any attention to -- until it is too late, and the censors have been 
already escaped." 
"Too late for what? 
That is something we shall have to find out. In any case, too 
late to stop what has found its voice." 
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Footnotes 
1. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, The Consciousness Industry. On 
Literature, Politics, and the Media (New York, 1974). 
2. Theodor Adorno, Minima Mora1ia (London, 1974), 26. 
3. See Eliot Weinberger's review of The Country Between Us (New 
York, 1981), in Sulfur 6 (1983), 161, 164. 
4. See the passage from Forche's poem "Message", quoted below. 
5. The next three and one-half lines of this passage go soft, 
flinching away from the preceding voice of judgment which ought to have 
warned Forche against further, facile maneuvers. She does not 
listen to that voice often enough in The Country Between Us. 
6. This is from an untitled poem by Arakawa and ~1adeline Gins, 
collected in a group of poems called "Language Sampler" edited and with 
an Introduction by Charles Bernstein (Paris Review 86 [Winter, 
1982], pp. 75ff.). The passage from "Lies" by Alan Davies is 
also taken from this selection of IILanguage" poems. 
7 • From my own "In ~1emory of Herzen," in Su lfur 7 (1983), 48. 
